In armed internal conflict, violence against civilians is frequent. For insurgent groups, so-called terrorist acts are an important part of conflict with the state and yet there are numerous unanswered questions about the role and uses of terrorism during these conflicts. This paper examines the causes of terrorism in the context of a larger struggle between a state and insurgent groups. In particular, we examine the hypothesis that outbidding among insurgent groups results in more suicide terrorism specifically 1 and also more terrorism of any type.
Introduction
Terrorism in Colombia, Chechnya, and Sri Lanka all demonstrate the frequency of terrorist violence that occurs during armed internal conflict. 4 By one estimate, terror attacks occurred 42% of the total years that an armed conflict was ongoing. For countries not involved in armed conflict, terrorist attacks occurred during only 12% of the total years -a substantial difference. 5 An extensive body of work has appeared attempting to explain the onset, dynamics, duration, and resolution of armed conflict. 6 Likewise, considerable research examines the determinants of terrorism. 7 Yet, we have little idea of how terrorism relates to armed conflict.
Most current literature on armed conflict shares a common emphasis on "what happens to" the conflict -how does it begin, how long does it last, and how durable is any peace that follows. Where terrorism is discussed, current research emphasizes the effects of terrorism on the conflict 8 rather than the opposite -the effects of the conflict on terrorism or, more generally, determinants of the use of terror during armed conflict. As Sambanis 9 notes, terror might feed off of an armed conflict or vice versa.
In contexts such as the first Chechen conflict (1994) (1995) (1996) , terrorism appears to have become an outgrowth of the conflict and not the other way around. Terrorist violence during armed conflicts (or higher scale violence such as war) has only recently drawn serious attention.
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While it is possible that terrorism is only a "by-product of the normal course of war", arguably it is used as a formal "military tactic" by insurgent and state groups. 12 Some scholars, such as Kalyvas 13 , argue that the logic of terrorism is applicable in the context of armed conflict, presumably meaning that terrorism is used as part of the execution of the conflict. Recent scholarly work suggests this is the case, identifying a strategy of terrorism in several different circumstances: terrorism intended to strengthen support hypotheses; and yet a thorough, systematic test of outbidding hypotheses has not been undertaken. If the outbidding argument is correct, then we should expect that where more insurgent groups engage in armed conflict with the state, more suicide terrorism and perhaps more terrorism generally will occur. In this paper, we test several of these possibilities.
As an initial inquiry and to establish a baseline, we use statistical analysis on all countries from 1970-2004, regardless of whether an armed conflict occurred, to test whether outbidding increases the incidence of suicide terrorism. Given Bloom's emphasis on insurgent groups and "later iterations" of conflict, an analysis of all countries in the world is not the most appropriate test. We, therefore, narrow the focus to all countries engaged in armed conflict and test whether outbidding in this context makes suicide terrorism more likely. Furthermore, we question whether the outbidding logic applies exclusively to suicide terrorism; thus, we also consider the possibility that outbidding increases all types of terrorism, rather than suicide terrorism only. We use multiple measures of terrorism, multiple measures of the number of insurgent groups potentially engaged in outbidding, and a variety of statistical estimation techniques to evaluate these expectations.
We find limited support for the idea that the number of insurgent groups increases the likelihood of suicide terror. The association exists under a very limited set of circumstances; usually when no control variables are present or when a less appropriate statistical estimator is used. These relationships are weakest, furthermore, in the context of armed conflict, which is when the outbidding thesis should be most applicable.
This calls into question one of the most prominent theories of suicide terrorism in both academic and policy communities. It also suggests that further research be carried out on this topic. When we extend Bloom's thesis to terrorism in general, we do not find any evidence that the number of insurgent groups is related to the frequency of terror events. there is an emerging consensus, both in academic and policy circles, about the core meaning of the concept of terrorism: "Most agree that terrorism is a set of methods or strategies of combat rather than an identifiable ideology or movement, and that terrorism involves premeditated use of violence against (at least primarily) non-combatants in order to achieve a psychological effect of fear on others than the immediate targets".
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Consistent with this understanding, we use the following definition in this paper:
Terrorism refers to deliberate, violent acts against civilians designed to create anxiety or fear in the population so that political, social, or economic demands can be made on the government or the public. Put this way, terrorism is a strategy, employed against civilians, to compel a state or the population to take actions consistent with a group's goals. Although some definitions of terrorism require that violence be directed at a state, our definition allows the target of the terror attacks to be the larger population.
In this way, groups can use violence against civilians not only to combat the government, but also to induce cooperation within the population or obtain more support from the population in the form of safe havens or recruits.
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The purpose underlying suicide terrorism might be similar to ordinary terrorism, although many scholars consider it to be a distinct tactic because it requires the attacker to give his or her life and, arguably, attracts more supporters and is more effective.
Terrorism, especially suicide terrorism, is often popularized in the media, and by some psychological approaches, as irrational -behavior in which people participate because of uncontrollable psychological and social processes, 28 rather than in the rational pursuit of their goals. Yet convincing evidence demonstrates that terrorist behavior is indeed a rational strategy to achieve individual and group goals 29 showing, for example, that terrorist behavior clusters around important events such as negotiations between insurgents and a government before, during, and after peace agreements to armed conflicts.
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A variation on the non-rationality argument is that terrorism is individually irra- One explanation for terrorism is that extremists use terror to induce more support from moderates. 42 The assumption is that when extremists use terrorism, they are able to induce moderates to become more extreme. Since it is difficult to persuade others to support a weak group, the group must attempt to elicit a repressive response by the government to push moderates closer to the extremist group's position and increase its capabilities. 43 During the 1999 Kosovo war, for example, ethnic Albanian extremists resorted to terrorist violence against their own people in an attempt to sway moderates to the extremists' cause. Similar dynamics occur in other countries and armed conflicts, such as Algeria. 44 Thus, having an extreme position, or being part of an ethnic minority, could make terrorism a rational strategy. This extremistmoderate argument has been developed in the context of a single extremist group, but raises the question of how multiple extremist groups interact.
When multiple weak insurgent groups exist, they could compete with each other to attract domestic support, coerce opponents, and attract aid from international donors. 45 They could engage in terror, and increasingly destructive terror like suicide bombing, in order to distinguish themselves. While this theory has gained a good deal of scholarly attention, especially as it conflicts with some of Pape's expectations, 46 few attempts have been made to evaluate cross-nationally the hypotheses that her argument generates. The idea that insurgent groups use suicide terror to outbid each other is compelling, but it has not been tested systematically. Because substantial scholarly and policy attention has been devoted to the argument, a systematic evaluation of the relationship is important. it could give more insight into the most important determinants of suicide terrorism.
The Logic of Outbidding
Insurgent groups contending against the state typically have the goal to establish a new state, take over an existing government, or at least secure some policy concessions, such as greater regional autonomy. Whether they are interested in seceding to establish a new government or attempting to overthrow the existing government, in some sense the goal is the same -the opposition groups seek more extensive control over the population. The insurgent groups might be active combatants or they could be emerging movements trying to garner enough support to shift from a popular movement to an organized fighting force. Terrorism is one among a variety of means that insurgent groups can use to pursue these goals. Most often, it is assumed that combatants use direct military behavior or guerrilla warfare waged in the mountains or other rough terrain. And yet frequently combatants engage in violence against civilians during armed conflict. Insurgents might only use one strategy, such as terrorism or guerrilla warfare; alternatively, they might pursue a combination of the two.
An implicit assumption in most work is that insurgent terror is particularly likely when there exists a significant imbalance in the distribution of capabilities that favors the government, which characterizes most armed conflicts. 57 The degree of asymmetry can vary by opposition group depending on the extent to which the group has organized itself by the time the war is escalating. Over the course of a longer or more deadly conflict, the degree of power asymmetry can fluctuate in a number of ways.
Combatants successful in battle gain territory, capture arms, or obtain new recruits, thereby increasing in strength relative to the other side as well as to other groups. Yet an insurgent group need not enlist the population to take part in rebellion. As T.E.
Lawrence, the famous guerrilla war theorist, notes "Rebellions can be made by 2 percent actively in the striking force and 98 percent passively sympathetic". 58 Strength, then, for the insurgent organization is increased through acquiring popular support. It allows the group to hide, move, transfer materials, and avoid denunciation.
The number of active or potential opposition groups in an armed conflict has a direct effect on the capability distribution. The number of groups vying for public support affects each group's ability to use violence against the government. During armed conflict, new insurgent groups can form, even in different regions of the country, which contributes to the variation in asymmetries between the opposition groups and the government. As the number of insurgent groups increases, and each group vies for the same number of people and resources for support, the smaller the shares of resources and support there will be for each group. According to the outbidding thesis, the consequence of this competition is that the groups might try to shift tactics in order to attract more support. Bloom argues that groups adopt more extreme tactics in an attempt to outbid each other: "the outbidding is directed toward the domestic population who sponsor, join, support, or 'vote' for these organizations". 59 Thus, a testable implication of the outbidding thesis is:
The greater the number of opposition groups, the more likely suicide terrorism will occur in armed conflict.
The outbidding argument is primarily about a shift in tactics. Current literature is unclear, however, about what exactly occurs prior to the shift to suicide terror. It is possible that groups shift from any terror to suicide terror. But it is also possible that groups shift from non-violence or guerrilla tactics to suicide terror. These two options do not represent the full range of possibilities. They assume that some form of low-level violence is occurring and that a shift to some more extreme tactic occurs.
More generally, we could imagine other possible tactic changes that make groups more extreme such as the shift from guerrilla tactics to any type of terrorism. Kydd and Walter contend that one of the primary strategies of terrorism generally is outbidding and that when multiple groups are vying for support, outbidding is likely to lead to terrorism. 60 Insurgents might attempt to become more extreme by increasing the use of violence against civilians rather than against military targets. While Bloom's outbidding argument applies primarily to suicide terrorism, the basic logic arguably applies to other contexts as well. This suggests the following hypothesis:
The greater the number of opposition groups, the more likely any terrorist acts will occur during armed conflict.
We have attempted to clarify the various conditions under which outbidding could matter and have identified two possibilities: outbidding could increase suicide terrorism in countries engaged in ongoing armed conflict (H1) and outbidding could increase any terrorism in countries engaged in armed conflict (H2 differently from the earlier data; we pool both sets of data in our primary analyses, but also separate them in subsequent tests to be careful about any potential threats to valid inferences. The number of suicide attacks is much smaller than total terrorist attacks, but in both cases substantial periods exist where no terrorism occurs at all.
The GTD contains data both on domestic and transnational attacks. Because we are most interested in civil wars, the domestic terrorism data are most appropriate for our purposes. Many armed conflicts become internationalized, however, and so transnational terrorism data can be appropriate. When using subsets of the data that make distinctions between domestic and transnational data, furthermore, the results are qualitatively very similar. The unit of analysis in the armed-conflict analyses is the country-month, which warrants some discussion. Ideally, the armed conflict month would be the unit of analysis, because multiple armed conflicts could be ongoing in a given country at the same time. The terrorism data are extremely difficult to disaggregate by armed conflict, however, which necessitates using all of the data within the country during the time the armed conflict is ongoing. This is potentially a drawback, but on the other hand is justifiable on theoretical and empirical grounds. In addition to insurgents actively involved in armed conflict, other weaker movements might use terror as a way of increasing their support in order to participate in the conflict more fully. These emerging groups might not be considered active insurgent groups at the time they use terrorism and they could operate in various parts of the country, but still be motivated by factors occurring within the conflict zone. If we confined our attention only to established rebel groups, or only to events occurring in the conflict regions, then there is the potential of missing a significant portion of terrorist behavior. The Moscow theater raid, in which 120 hostages died, as well as the school hostage attack in Beslan
Russia that left more than 300 people dead, most of them children, are examples of the types of cases that would be excluded from an analysis that only focused on events occurring within the conflict zone (i.e., Chechnya). By the Kalyvas logic, 72 regions in which violence are not occurring might still be important to the armed conflict; they could be regions of incumbent or insurgent control, rather than contested regions where much of the bilateral violence is likely to be observed.
Because the critical component of the outbidding thesis is the number of actors engaged in competition for popular support, we use three alternative measures to establish whether there is a relationship: the number of terrorist groups based on the GTD, the number of veto players during armed conflict as defined by Cunningham, 73 and the number of actors from the Uppsala Database. 74 We obtained the number of terrorist groups from the GTD by identifying terrorist events in which a group is identified as a perpetrator. This approach is not perfect because perpetrators are often not identified. Thus, the actual number of terrorist groups differs from the measure we obtain. Nonetheless, there is substantial variation on this measure and it captures most of the primary terrorist organizations as well as numerous smaller ones. Moreover, measuring the number of groups from the GTD likely biases in favor of finding positive results because the set of actors is already a set of known terrorist groups. Thus, this must be taken into account when interpreting the results.
In addition to beginning with a set of known terrorist groups, we also consider known insurgent groups that have not resorted to terrorism at all. They might shift from tactics such as guerrilla warfare to terrorism (and perhaps suicide terrorism) in order to outbid each other. We use two measures of combatant groups during armed conflict to test for this. First, we use a measure of whether an actor is a "lenient veto player" that has a sufficient organizational structure and capacity to affect the dynamics of armed conflicts. 75 The logic of outbidding suggests that weaker groups need to outbid in order to generate more support and so we use a lenient measure of veto players that might have more variability in the number of actors. Also, we use a measure of actors from the Uppsala database that has a higher number of actors on average than the veto player measure. Note that the veto player and Uppsala actors measures are coded for each civil conflict not country. As such, we collapsed the number of actors by country so that we examine the "maximum" number of actors in a given country and time period.
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Because the dependent variables are counts of suicide terrorist events and any terrorist events respectively, the appropriate statistical technique is some form of a count model. There is considerable variance in the number of terrorist events over the years and months in the samples, which indicates that a negative binomial model, rather than a poisson, be estimated. The data also contain many years and months with no terrorism at all, however, which requires an additional step in the analysis.
Because of the presence of so many observations in which no terrorism occurs, a zeroinflated negative binomial (ZINB) is the most appropriate statistical technique. We estimate both negative binomial and zero-inflated negative binomial models and the results are almost always the same. For ease of interpretation, we primarily report the negative binomial results, but report the qualitative results for the ZINB ("Yes" if expected sign and statistically significant; "No" otherwise). Because suicide terrorism is a fairly rare event, like Wade and Reiter 77 we also estimate rare-events logit models on a dichotomized dependent variable capturing whether any suicide terror occurred in a given time period.
We address the outbidding relationship under a wide variety of conditions to understand whether a relationship exists and, if so, how robust it is. Although we control for a number of factors, we primarily report the results on our different measures of actors (given different samples and measures of terrorism). In the results section, we are mostly interested in whether there is a positive and statistically significant relationship and tailor the discussion to this effect. Full tables with all of our analyses including control variables are available upon request.
An Evaluation of the Outbidding Hypothesis
As a first step, we reestimated Wade and Reiter's 78 model including a measure of the number of terrorist groups based on the GTD. The results appear in Table 1 [ We now consider additional specifications to uncover under which conditions, if any, the outbidding thesis holds. The results of these additional analyses are reported in We note that even the results that support Hypothesis 1 might reflect a correlation that is an artifact of the data. Although the suicide terrorism measure is not derived from the number of groups measure, it is likely that the more terrorist groups there are in a country, the more likely it is that there will be at least some that use suicide terrorism. That is, outbidding might not be occurring; it might just be that with a large number of groups using a variety of tactics, suicide terrorism -like all other tactics -is likely to occur to some extent. Because the rare-events logit and the inflate portion of the ZINB are based on a dichotomized dependent variable, they are only picking up whether suicide terrorism has been used at least once. Thus, it is not out of the question, by any means, that a spurious relationship exists. Now consider the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th rows, which are based on armed conflict years only. These analyses are most crucial for establishing whether the outbidding thesis holds, because they address insurgent groups explicitly and most closely approximate what Bloom calls the "second iteration...of conflict". 81 We report the results for the number of GTD actors during ongoing armed conflicts in the row titled "GTD Actors (conflict years). Following, we report the same tests, but with the "Lenient Veto Player produce results that are either positive but not statistically significant or in some cases negative and statistically significant. For example, the number of Uppsala actors is negatively related (and statistically significant) to suicide terrorism using the full set of Wade and Reiter control variables. Although it appears that there is not a strong relationship between outbidding and suicide terrorism, we also noted above that the outbidding logic might apply to other shifts in tactics, including to any type terrorism from guerrilla warfare. We investigate this possibility now. Table 3 shows the results from 16 additional analyses in which GTD terrorist events are the dependent variable (rather than suicide terrorism). This we do not estimate rare-events logit models in these cases because, although terrorism occurs a minority of the time, terrorism is nonetheless common enough that it is not considered a rare-event.
[ TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE]
Like most of the results discussed above, the results of these additional analyses do not offer support for Hypothesis 2. Interestingly, in both the "Lenient Veto Players"
and "Uppsala Actors" cases, the number of actors has a negative relationship and in some analyses the relationship is statistically significant. The results offer little support for a relationship between the number of groups and the likelihood of terrorism generally. 84 And these results mostly fit with the results for suicide terrorism casting doubt that the outbidding thesis is an encompassing explanation for suicide terrorism or any terrorism generally throughout the world.
Conclusion
We addressed what has become in recent years a very popular thesis on suicide terrorism. 85 Others have questioned the outbidding thesis, 86 but our analysis represents a first attempt to quantify the outbidding relationship in the context of suicide terrorism and terrorism more generally.
We specifically considered whether outbidding occurs when there is a multiplicity of insurgents engaged in armed conflict. Groups might begin with some form of violent behavior and take the next step to even more extreme violence, such as suicide terrorism; they might also begin with nonviolence (or guerrilla warfare) and become more extreme by targeting civilians through any form of terrorism. We examined both possibilities. The results of a very large number of analyses provide only limited support for the notion that outbidding occurs in relation to suicide terror. The results clearly do not support the idea that outbidding occurs in the context of terrorism more generally.
Similar to the democratic peace research program, the study of suicide terrorism is continually being refined. While early arguments related to democracy and violence suggested that democracies were more peaceful in all ways, this was later scaled back to the notion that democracies fight fewer wars, and then further refined to democracies fighting fewer wars with each other. How democracy is defined, and whether other violent behavior short of full-scale war is frequent among democratic regimes or within democratic dyads are still unresolved issues. Given these limitations, the democratic peace proposition is better understood after a number of refinements to the original set of ideas. 87 Using this research stream as a guide, more work should be done to unpack the various conditions related to the target of terrorism, the group perpetrating the act, and the country where the group operates.
In short, more research is needed to address the conditions under which groups proliferate and resort to suicide terrorism. The three right columns ask whether there is a positive and statistically significant relationship. Control variables include: state capabilities, democracy lagged, democracy squared and lagged; GDP per capita, and whether the armed conflict was ethnically based. 
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